

Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 02985 300138Z

71

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 PA-04

RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 USIA-15 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 SS-20

NSC-07 OMB-01 ACDA-19 IO-14 NEA-14 SCI-06 EA-11 DRC-01

/164 W

----- 079660

R 292305Z MAY 74

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5966

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

USLOSACLANT

CINCLANT

S E C R E T USNATO 2985

E.O. 11652: GDS 12/31/82

TAGS: PINR, NATO

SUBJECT: BRIEFING FOR NAC ON MC 161/74

REF: STATE 111704 NOTAL

SUMMARY. THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY STAFF BRIEFED THE COUNCIL MAY 29 ON THE WARSAW PACT STRENGTH AND CAPABILITIES, MC 161/74. FOLLOWING THE BRIEFING, THE COUNCIL DISCUSSED CERTAIN ASPECTS PRIMARILY RELATING TO (1) SOVIET SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND AIR-LIFT CAPABILITY; (2) SOVIET AND US NAVAL STRENGTH; (3) SOVIET CAPABILITY AND INTENTIONS VIS-A-VIS CHINA AND NATO; (4) SOVIET CAPABILITY FOR LIMITED MILITARY OPERATIONS; (5) SIGNALS PROVIDING WARNING TIME; AND (6) NATO USE OF PREPARATION TIME. SYG LUNS DREW ON HIS RECENT TRIP TO THE US IN PROVIDING THE COUNCIL SOME INSIGHTS INTO THESE ISSUES, PARTICULARLY CONCERNING NAVAL FORCES. US PERMREP (RUMSFELD) NOTED THAT MC 161/74 WAS MORE COMPREHENSIVE THAN PREVIOUS EDITIONS AND THAT THE US HOPES FOR FURTHER PROGRESS IN KEY AREAS AS RECOMMENDED BY THE STEERING SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 02985 300138Z

COMMITTEE OF THE AD HOC INTELLIGENCE WORKING GROUP. END SUMMARY.

1. THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY STAFF BRIEFED THE COUNCIL MAY 29 ON MC 161/74. THIS BRIEFING, PRESENTED BY MGEN FOURNAIS,

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, WAS GIVEN TO THE MILITARY COMMITTEE ON MAY 2. IT CONCENTRATED ON THE CHANGES FROM THE 1973 EDITION AND INCLUDED A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF MC 224/74.

2. FOLLOWING THE BRIEFING, SYG LUNS LED OFF DISCUSSION WITH REFERENCE TO MAY 20 NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE WHICH REFERRED TO A SECRET PENTAGON STUDY PURPORTING TO SHOW THAT THE SOVIET FLEET WAS AGING AND THAT ITS FUTURE THREAT WAS OVERSTATED. LUNS REPORTED TO COUNCIL THAT, DURING HIS RECENT TRIP TO US, HE HAD PERSONALLY ASKED SECRETARY SCHLESINGER ABOUT THE ARTICLE. ACCORDING TO LUNS, SECDEF ANSWERED THAT THE ARTICLE WAS FALSE. LUNS MENTIONED THAT SECNAV-DESIGNATE MIDDENDORF HAD ALSO DENOUNCED THE ARTICLE IN CLEAR TERMS. FINALLY, LUNS STATED THAT ANYONE DOUBTING THE MODERN EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SOVIET FLEET NEED ONLY PICK UP A 1974 COPY OF JANE'S FIGHTING SHIPS. HE STRONGLY SUPPORTED THE US POLICY OF TAKING OLDER SHIPS OUT OF COMMISSION AND EMBARKING ON AN AMBITIONS SHIPBUILDING PROGRAM.

3. BELGIAN PERMREP (DE STAERCKE) QUESTIONED FOUR POINTS MADE BY THE BRIEFING:

A. THAT SOVIET SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IS AS ADVANCED AS THE WEST. HE SAID THAT THIS CONTRADICTS INFORMATION HE HAD RECENTLY HEARD FROM AN ACKNOWLEDGED EXPERT WHO STATED THAT SOVIET TECHNOLOGY IS LAGGING BEHIND THE US'S.

B. THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE A SIGNIFICANT AIRLIFT CAPABILITY. DE STAERCKE HAD UNDERSTOOD FROM DISCUSSIONS THAT ONE OF THE IMPORTANT LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE OCTOBER WAR WAS THAT THE SOVIETS WERE GREATLY INFERIOR IN THIS AREA.

C. THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE INCREASED THEIR GROUND AND AIR FORCES FACING CHINA. DE STAERCKE ASKED IF THIS SIGNALLED ANY INTENT OR CHANGE OF POLICY VIS-A-VIS THE CHINESE.

SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 02985 300138Z

D. THE CONCLUSION THAT A WARSAW PACT ATTACK ON NATO IS UNLIKELY. DE STAERCKE ASKED ON WHAT BASIS THIS JUDGMENT IS MADE.

4. IN RESPONSE TO THESE POINTS, LUNS RETURNED TO HIS EARLIER STATEMENT CONCERNING THE SOVIET NAVAL FORCES, AND POINTED OUT THAT ALTHOUGH THE US IS RENEWING ITS FLEET, THE SOVIETS ALSO HAVE A GREAT SHIPBUILDING PROGRAM AND HAVE THE ADDED ADVANTAGE OF BEING ABLE TO CONCENTRATE THEIR NAVAL FORCES, WHEREAS NATO FORCES HAVE THE TASK OF KEEPING THE SEA LANES OPEN; THIS DOES NOT ALLOW ALLIED NAVAL FORCES TO CONCENTRATE TO THE EXTENT THE SOVIETS CAN. LUNS ALSO REFERRED TO PREVIOUS MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE WHICH ASKED NATO TO LOOK AT WARNING AND

MOBILIZATION TIME. MC 161/74 PROVIDES THIS INFORMATION CONCERNING THE WARSAW PACT BUT NOW WE SHOULD TAKE A BETTER LOOK AT NATO'S UTILIZATION OF PREPARATION TIME.

5. MGEN FOURNAIS WAS UNABLE TO RESOLVE THE CONTRADICTION CONCERNING SOVIET SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH. WITH REGARD TO SOVIET AIRLIFT CAPABILITY, HE DISCUSSED THE IMPRESSIVE AIRLIFT MOVEMENT OF SOVIET TROOPS DURING THEIR RECENT SPRING ROTATION AND INDICATED THAT THIS AIRLIFT CAPABILITY IS IMPROVING ALL THE TIME. AMBASSADOR (RUMSFELD) POINTED OUT THAT THE SOVIETS' PERFORMANCE DURING THE OCTOBER WAR WAS A FUNCTION OF BOTH AIRLIFT CAPABILITY AND THE NEED FOR THIS AIRLIFT AS PERCEIVED BY THE SOVIETS. THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET PERFORMANCE WAS LOW COMPARED TO THAT OF THE US DOES NOT, IN ITSELF, INDICATE A "HUGELY INFERIOR CAPABILITY" AS DE STAERCKE SAID. MGEN FOURNAIS GAVE HIS PERSONAL VIEW THAT THE INCREASED SOVIET STRENGTH FACING CHINA REFLECTED THEIR FEAR OF AN ATTACK FROM CHINA. FINALLY, HE RESTATED THE PROPOSITION THAT A WARSAW PACT ATTACK ON NATO IS UNLIKELY AT PRESENT BUT THE CAPABILITY DOES EXIST. HE FELT THAT THE SOVIETS PROBABLY EXPECT THE CAPITALISTIC SOCIETIES TO FAIL OF THEMSELVES OF INHERENT FLAWS AS PREDICTED BY LENIN SOME 50 YEARS AGO.

6. US PERMREP, DRAWING ON REFTEL, MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT:

SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 02985 300138Z

"I WANT TO EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION TO GENERAL FOURNAIS AND HIS INTELLIGENCE TEAM FOR THIS BRIEFING AND FOR THEIR WORK IN DEVELOPING THIS COMPREHENSIVE DOCUMENT.

"WE HOPE THE PROCESS OF EXAMINATION OF WARSAW PACT STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES CAN BE EVEN MORE COMPREHENSIVE IN MC 161/75 AND THAT NATO WORK WILL BE DIRECTED TOWARD ALL OF THE KEY ISSUES FOR MC 161/75 AS RECOMMENDED BY THE STEERING COMMITTEE OF THE AD HOC INTELLIGENCE WORKING GROUP.

"IN THAT CONNECTION, I AM DISTRIBUTING BY LETTER TODAY SOME DETAILED VIEWS OF MY GOVERNMENT ON THE PREPARATION OF MC 161/75."

7. THE DANISH PERMREP (SVART) FELT THAT CIVIL FACTORS WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION ALSO WOULD INFLUENCE WARNING TIME AVAILABLE. THE SOVIET POPULACE FEARS ANOTHER WAR AND WOULD HAVE TO BE CONDITIONED IN ADVANCE SHOULD THE SOVIETS PLAN AN ATTACK. THESE CIVIL PREPARATIONS, EVEN IF CARRIED OUT BY THE PARTY MACHINERY, WOULD PROVIDE AN INDICATION TO NATO.

8. THE UK PERMREP (PECK) NOTED THAT THE DISCUSSION OF MC 161/74 WAS ONE OF THE FEW POLITICO/MILITARY DISCUSSIONS HELD

BY THE COUNCIL. HE FELT THAT THE PROPER USE OF WARNING TIME, AS PREPARATION TIME, WAS A KEY ISSUE FACING THE ALLIANCE. ALSO, EVEN IF A SOVIET ATTACK IS UNLIKELY, NATO CANNOT BE COMPLACENT; THE SOVIETS UNDERSTAND THE PRINCIPLES OF POWER POLITICS AND ARE CAPABLE OF APPLYING THOSE PRINCIPLES. HOWEVER, PECK CAUTIONED AGAINST NATO OVER-REACTION TO POLITICAL SIGNALS.

9. THE CANADIAN PERMREP (MENZIES) FELT THAT THE BRIEFING DID NOT BRING OUT THE ABILITY OF THE SOVIET UNION TO CONDUCT LIMITED OBJECTIVE MILITARY OPERATIONS, AS IN THE MIDDLE EAST OR YUGOSLAVIA. HE CONSIDERS THIS SCENARIO THE MOST LIKELY TYPE AND WORTHY OF ANALYSIS IN DEPTH. IN RESPONSE, LUNS POINTED OUT THAT THE SOVIETS OBVIOUSLY HAVE THE CAPABILITY FOR SUCH LIMITED OPERATIONS AND THAT, IN THE CASE OF THE OCTOBER WAR, THE US WAS AWARE OF SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE INTENTIONS. MGEN FOURNAIS FELT THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT EMBARK ON A LIMITED MILITARY ADVENTURE IF THEY BELIEVED THE US WOULD BE DRAWN INTO THE CONFLICT. MC 161/74
SECRET

PAGE 05 NATO 02985 300138Z

DOES NOT ADDRESS THIS ISSUE IN DETAIL. LUNS RECALLED A BRIEFING HE HAD BEEN GIVEN BY THE ITALIAN HIGH COMMAND (SIC) IN VERONA (ACTUALLY, COMLANDSOUTH) WHICH GAVE THE SOVIETS, WITH HUNGARIAN COOPERATION, A VERY HIGH CAPABILITY TO ATTACK NORTHERN ITALY THROUGH THE GORIZIA GAP ON SHORT NOTICE. THE ITALIANS ADMITTED, HOWEVER, THAT THIS WAS A PESSIMISTIC VIEW.
RUMSFELD

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 11 JUN 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 29 MAY 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: garlanwa
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974ATO02985
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS 12/31/82
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740587/abbryvfl.tel
Line Count: 194
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: STATE 111704 NOTAL
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: garlanwa
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 09 APR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <09 APR 2002 by shawdg>; APPROVED <10-Sep-2002 by garlanwa>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: BRIEFING FOR NAC ON MC 161/74
TAGS: PINR, NATO
To: STATE
SECDEF INFO USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR
USLOSACLANT
CINCLANT
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

